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Abstract
In this paper, we propose new quantum arithmetic protocols among multiple parties. Let some parties have values. A problem
is to find a protocol such that under the condition that any eavesdropper intercepting any quantum system being exchanged among
the parties must not be able to acquire information, the parties compute an arithmetic operation such as addition and multiplication,
and transfer its computing result to another party. One of main ideas to solve this problem is based on operating state phases.
A quantum addition algorithm based on operating phases has been proposed by Draper, but his algorithm was not considered being
eavesdropped. We propose secure quantum arithmetic protocols.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Feynman asked whether current digital computers can precisely simulate physical phenomena or not, and pointed
out that they may not be able to precisely simulate physical phenomena [12]. In addition, he also suggested that
new computers in which inherent properties of quantum physics are involved, quantum computers, may be more
powerful than current computers. In 1985, a quantum computer called quantum Turing machine was proposed by
Deutsch [9]. However, Deutsch’s quantum computer was not sufficiently formalized either. In 1993, Bernstein and
Vazirani formalized mathematically Deutsch’s quantum computer [4].
After that, some results have indicated that the quantum computer seems to be more powerful than current com-
puters. One of the most important results on quantum computation are Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm [21]. The
essence of Shor’s algorithm is to find the period r of a periodic function f (x) = f (x + r) in polynomial time by using
a quantum Fourier transform. Another familiar result is Grover’s quantum search algorithm [14]. The technique used
in Grover’s algorithm is a quantum amplitude amplification, i.e., a method to increase the probability of accepting
states by using an algorithm repeatedly. Many of proposed quantum algorithms are based on these two algorithms.
On the other hand, there also exist many important results on quantum information security. For example, it is
shown that there exist unconditionally secure quantum secret key distribution protocols (see, e.g., [1,2,7,11,17,18]).
In the quantum protocols, qubit states are transfered or quantum entangled states are shared among multiple parties.
These states are used for transferring information securely. Moreover, these can also transfer more information than
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they are also used in several quantum communication protocols, e.g., in quantum teleportation [3], in quantum secret
sharing scheme [15,16,18], in quantum communication complexity theory [5,6,8,13], and so on.
In this paper, we propose new quantum arithmetic protocols among multiple parties. Let some parties have values.
A problem is to find a protocol such that the parties compute an arithmetic operation such as addition and multipli-
cation, and transfer its computing result to another party without letting any party knowing any input or intermediate
result. In other words, the problem is whether they can secretly compute the arithmetic operation under the condi-
tion that any eavesdropper intercepting any quantum system being exchanged among the parties must not be able to
acquire information. This problem has been studied as multi-party protocols (as a summary, see, e.g., [20]).
In order to solve this problem, quantum addition protocols among multiple parties using entangled states have been
proposed in [19]. In this paper, we show different quantum arithmetic protocols in order to solve this problem. First,
we construct another type of quantum addition protocols in which the parties do not share entangled states but only
transfer qubit states. Next, we construct quantum multiplication protocols. Throughout this paper, we assume that a
party (later, we call the party Q) can obtain always the computing result correctly. This assumption is important for
solving this problem securely.
In order to construct these protocols, we use the technique of quantum communication complexity protocols. In
[5,6,8], they used entangled states for decreasing the communication complexity, and entangled states seemed to
be essential for this. In [19], we constructed quantum addition protocols by using this technique. Later, it is shown
that by only transferring qubit states, the similar communication complexity protocols can be constructed (see, e.g.,
[13]). In this paper, we use both ideas in order to construct quantum arithmetic protocols. As another main idea to
solve this problem, we use the technique of operating state phases. A quantum addition algorithm based on operating
phases has been proposed by Draper [10]. However, his algorithm was not considered being eavesdropped and was
not constructed as a protocols among multiple parties.
The remainder of this paper has the following organization. In Section 2, we define basic notations and quantum
operations used in this paper. In Section 3, we show quantum addition protocols. In Section 4, we show quantum
multiplication protocols. Finally, in Section 5, we describe some concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
First, we denote some basic notations. Let R be the set of real numbers. Let B = {0,1}, Zn = {0,1, . . . , n − 1},
and Z+n = {1,2, . . . , n− 1} for a positive integer n. For bi ∈ B (i = 1,2, . . . , n), we denote an n-bit string b ∈ Bn (i.e.,
|b| = n) by b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), where |b| is the size of b. Let a and b be integers. We say that a is congruent to b
to modulus n if n is a divisor of a − b and denote by a ≡ b (mod n). Finally, let ⊕ be an exclusive-or operator, e.g.,
(1,1,0,0) ⊕ (1,0,1,0) = (0,1,1,0).
Next, we define some basic quantum operations. As states of quantum binary digits, let |0〉 = (1 0 )T and |1〉 =
(0 1 )T, where |·〉 is Dirac notation and AT is the transposed matrix of matrix A. Throughout this paper, we take
Bq = {|0〉, |1〉} as a computational basis and a measurement basis. A general state in a quantum two-state system can
be denoted by a superposition of the basis, i.e., |q〉 = α0|0〉+α1|1〉 = (α0, α1)T, where α0 and α1 are complex numbers
satisfying |α0|2 + |α1|2 = 1. We call a quantum state in the two-state system qubit state. In addition, we denote an
n-qubit basis state by |b1〉 ⊗ |b2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |bn〉 = |b1〉|b2〉 · · · |bn〉 = |b1, b2, . . . , bn〉, where ⊗ is a tensor product and
|bi〉 ∈ Bq (i = 1,2, . . . , n). A general n-qubit state can be denoted by ∑|b〉∈Bnq αb|b〉, where each αb is a complex
number and
∑
|b〉∈Bnq |αb|2 = 1. Moreover, we denote a basis in an N -dimensional system, a basis of qudit states,
by ZNq = {|x〉 | x ∈ ZN }, where N ( 2) is an integer. A general state of qudit can be denoted by
∑
|y〉∈ZnNq αy |y〉,
where each αy is a complex number and
∑
|y〉∈ZnNq |αy |
2 = 1. Especially, when N = 2n and x =∑n−1i=0 bi2i for bi ∈ B
(i = 0,1, . . . , n − 1), we can express |x〉 by |bn−1, bn−2, . . . , b0〉 and it is called state of quantum register.
In a similar concept to classical digital computers, we only express elementary operations on the states of qubits
or quantum registers (N = 2n) because any integer can be expressed by binary notation. A quantum algorithm is the
combination of quantum state transitions and measurements. A state transition of n-qubit states can be specified by a
2n × 2n unitary matrix U . Note that for a 2n1 × 2n1 unitary matrix U1 and a 2n2 × 2n2 unitary matrix U2, U1 ⊗U2 is a
2n1+n2 ×2n1+n2 unitary matrix. By a state transition U , an n-qubit state |ψ〉 is transformed to a state U |ψ〉. In order to
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measurement in basis Bnq on an n-qubit state |ψ〉 =
∑
|b〉∈Bnq αb|b〉, the state changes from |ψ〉 to |b〉 with probability
|αb|2 for each |b〉 ∈ Bnq , and b is interpreted as the classical outcome of the measurement.
Finally, we define some unitary matrices used for state transitions in this paper. We use 2 × 2 unitary matrices
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and S(θ) =
(
1 0
0 eıπθ
)
for one-qubit state transition, where let ı2 = −1. The matrix H is called Walsh–Hadamard operator. Note that H−1 =
H and S−1(θ) = S(−θ). Moreover, we define two matrices for N -state transition. Let x ∈ ZN . A quantum Fourier
transform [21], QFT , is
QFT|x〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
y=0
eı2πxy/N |y〉.
We also define a shift operator, SE(θ), by
SE(θ)|x〉 = eıπθx |x〉.
Note that S−1E (θ) = SE(−θ). For example, this operator can be constructed as follows. Let x =
∑n−1
i=0 bi2i , where
bi ∈ B (i = 0,1, . . . , n − 1). Then, |x〉 = |bn−1, bn−2, . . . , b0〉. We apply S(θ2n−1) for the first qubit state, S(θ2n−2)
for the second qubit state, and so on. Finally, we apply S(θ20) for the last qubit state. Then, the state becomes
eıπθ
∑n−1
i=0 bi2i |x〉 = eıπθx |x〉.
This means that SE(θ) =∏n−1i=0 (I⊗n−i−1 ⊗ S(θ2i ) ⊗ I⊗i ), where let I be the 2 × 2 identity matrix and I⊗0 be no
operation.
3. Quantum addition protocols
In this section, we show protocols of quantum addition algorithms among multiple parties. First, we consider the
addition of non-negative integers.
ADD: Let P1,P2, . . . ,Pm be m parties and let each party Pi have a non-negative integer ni  0. Then, a party Q
wishes to obtain the sum s =∑mi=1 ni under the condition that any eavesdropper intercepting any quantum system
being exchanged among the parties must not be able to acquire information.
Here, let N  2 be a positive integer satisfying N = 2n and let Q know a positive integer L such that s < NL−1 for
convenience sake. Moreover, let s =∑Lj=0 yjNj for each yj ∈ ZN (j ∈ ZL+1). Theoretically, our protocols shown in
the following results can choose any positive number for N . Therefore, if we can efficiently construct and compute
quantum operations on N -dimensional system, we do not need to restrict N to a power of two. In this case, we can
replace quantum registers to qudits. Note that the ability of our protocols does not decrease even if N is restricted to
a power of two.
In [19], we have shown quantum addition algorithms using entangled states in order to solve ADD. However, the
manipulation of entangled states is practically much harder. In this section, we consider constructing quantum addition
algorithms such that parties do not share entangled states.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a quantum protocol in order to solve ADD.
Proof. First, we construct a quantum protocol satisfying ADD in the following way.
(1) Execute the following procedures for j = 0,1, . . . ,L in order.
(a) Q makes a state
1√
N
N−1∑
|x〉x=0
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1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2πrQj x |x〉.
Then, Q sends it to P1.
(b) Execute the following procedure for i = 1,2, . . . ,m − 1 in order.
(i) Pi selects a random rP ij ∈ R, applies SE(2(rP ij + ni/Nj+1)) to the state, and sends it to Pi+1.
(c) Pm selects a random rPmj ∈ R, applies SE(2(rPmj + nm/Nj+1)) to the state, and sends it to P1. Here, the
state becomes
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2π(rQj +
∑m
i=1(rP ij +ni/Nj+1))x |x〉.
(d) Execute the following procedure for i = 1,2, . . . ,m − 1 in order.
(i) Pi applies SE(−2rP ij ) to the state and sends it to Pi+1.
(e) Pm applies SE(−2rPmj ) to the state and sends it to Q.
(f) Q applies SE(−2∑j−1k=0 ykNk/Nj+1) to the state, and then the state becomes
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2π(rQj +(
∑m
i=1 ni−
∑j−1
k=0 ykNk)/Nj+1)x |x〉
= 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2π(rQj +(s−
∑j−1
k=0 ykNk)/Nj+1)x |x〉
= 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2πrQj xeı2πyj x/N |x〉.
(g) Q also applies SE(−2rQj ) and QFT to the state. Then,
QFT · SE(−2rQj )
(
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2πrQj xeı2πyj x/N |x〉
)
= 1
N
N−1∑
u=0
(
N−1∑
x=0
eı2π(yj+u)x/N
)
|u〉 = |u′〉,
where yj + u′ ≡ 0 (mod N). Therefore, Q can obtain yj by computing −u′ (mod N).
(2) Finally, Q obtains the sum s by computing ∑Lj=0 yjNj .
In this protocol, any eavesdropper cannot know any input or intermediate result. Obviously, Q can only know the
value of s because of each rP ij . Moreover, each Pi cannot know any other input or intermediate result because of rQj
and each rP ij . 
Obviously, Q does not need to know the value of L because the protocol only takes the repeat count sufficiently
large. Moreover, we can also make a change such that instead of Q, one of Pi can obtain the sum.
Especially, we can construct a quantum binary addition protocol by let N = 2.
Corollary 1. There exists a quantum binary protocol in order to solve ADD.
Proof. In Theorem 3.1, let us consider a protocol for N = 2. First, Q makes a state 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉). For a binary
protocol, the parties use S and H instead of SE and QFT in the protocol of Theorem 3.1. 
Next, let us consider extending this result to the addition of any integers.
GADD: Let P1,P2, . . . ,Pm be m parties and let each party Pi have an integer ni . Then, a party Q wishes to obtain
the sum s =∑mi=1 ni under the condition that any eavesdropper intercepting any quantum system being exchanged
among the parties must not be able to acquire information.
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This means that we can also compute the subtraction of integers.
Here, we consider a similar classical protocol. Q selects a random rQj ∈ R and sends it to P1. P1 computes s1 =
rQj + n1 and sends s1 to P2. P2 computes s2 = s1 + n2 and sends s2 to P3, and so on. Pm computes sm = sm−1 + nm
and sends sm to Q. Finally, Q computes sm − rQj and obtains s. In this protocol, however, if a party knows two
consecutive intermediate results si and si+1, the party can know ni+1 by computing si+1 − si . The situation does not
change even if each party adds each random value because the same problem occurs when the parties remove the
random values. Moreover, rQj is known to P1. Therefore, the parties need to encrypt the transfer values in classical
protocols.
On the other hand, it is known that any unknown quantum state cannot be copied precisely. Moreover, we assume
that Q can obtain always the computing result correctly. This means that the initial state made by Q need to be used
in the quantum protocol because only Q knows the random rQj and only each Pi knows each random rP ij . Thus, any
party cannot know intermediate result. In addition, by sharing entangled states between two parties, e.g.,
1√
2
(|0,0〉 + |1,1〉),
and using the technique of teleportation [3], the parties can only send classical bits instead of qubit states. Because
there are no problems even if these bits are known, the parties can securely transfer the qubit states in the quantum
protocols. These observations are also applicable to the following proposed protocols.
4. Quantum multiplication protocols
In this section, we show protocols of quantum multiplication algorithms among multiple parties. First, we consider
the multiplication of two positive integers.
MULTI(P2): Let P1 and P2 be two parties, P1 have a positive integer n1 > 0, and P2 have a positive integer n2 > 0.
Then, a party Q wishes to obtain the multiplication t = n1 ×n2 under the condition that any eavesdropper intercepting
any quantum system being exchanged among the parties must not be able to acquire information.
For convenience’ sake, let Q know a positive integer L such that t < NL−1, and the parties know a positive
integer L′ such that max{
log2 n1, 
log2 n2} L′. Then, let t =
∑L
j=0 yjNj for each yj ∈ ZN (j ∈ ZL+1), and let
n1 =∑L′k=0 n1,k2k and n2 =∑L′k=0 n2,k2k for each n1,k, n2,k ∈ B (k ∈ ZL′+1).
The basic idea of constructing quantum protocols of this problem is the following computation. Let S0 = {k | k ∈
ZL′+1 and n1,k = 0} and S1 = {k | k ∈ ZL′+1 and n1,k = 1}. Note that S0 ∪ S1 = ZL′+1 and S0 ∩ S1 = ∅. Then,
n1 × n2 =
(∑
k∈S0
n1,k2k +
∑
k∈S1
n1,k2k
)
× n2 =
∑
k∈S1
n22k,
because n1,k = 0 for k ∈ S0 and n1,k = 1 for k ∈ S1. Therefore, if P1 can give whether each n1,k is an element in S0
or an element in S1 to P2 without being known to P2, the parties can solve MULTI(P2).
A protocol computing n1 × n2 is constructed in the following way: for every k, P1 sends a part of the legitimate
entangled state to P2 if k ∈ S1; otherwise P1 sends a dummy state to P2. P2 applies SE(2n22k) to the state. Then, the
phase of the legitimate state is proportional to eı2π
∑
k∈S1 n22
k = eı2πn1n2 .
Theorem 4.1. There exists a quantum protocol in order to solve MULTI(P2).
Proof. We construct a quantum protocol satisfying MULTI(P2) in the following way.
(1) Execute the following procedures for j = 0,1, . . . ,L in order.
(a) The parties share an entangled state
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
|x, x, x, x〉,
where Pi has the ith quantum register and Q has the last two quantum registers.
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|Ψ 〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2πrQj x |x, x, x, x〉.
Then, Q sends the last register to P1.
(c) P1 selects a random rP1j ∈ R and applies SE(2rP1j ) to the last register. Then, let the state |Ψ 〉 evolve into
|Ψ ′ (1)〉. Moreover, P1 prepares a dummy state |Ψ ′ (2)〉 such that the other parties cannot distinguish between
|Ψ ′ (2)〉 and |Ψ ′ (1)〉 in the following steps.
(d) Execute the following procedures for k = 0,1, . . . ,L′ in order.
(i) Let |Ψk〉 := |Ψ ′ (1)〉 and |Ψ ′k〉 := |Ψ ′ (2)〉 if n1,k−1 = 1; otherwise |Ψ ′k〉 := |Ψ ′ (1)〉 and |Ψk〉 := |Ψ ′ (2)〉,
where let n1,−1 = 1 and the operation |S2〉 := |S1〉 means that |S1〉 is renamed |S2〉 for convenience’ sake
(note that this is not a copy). P1 chooses |Ψ (1)〉 := |Ψk〉 and |Ψ (2)〉 := |Ψ ′k〉 if n1,k = 1; otherwise P1
chooses |Ψ (1)〉 := |Ψ ′k〉 and |Ψ (2)〉 := |Ψk〉. Then, P1 sends the last registers of |Ψ (1)〉 and |Ψ (2)〉 to P2.
(ii) P2 selects a random rP2j,k ∈ R, computes |Ψ ′ (1)〉 := SE(2(rP2j,k + n22k/Nj+1))|Ψ (1)〉 and |Ψ ′ (2)〉 :=
SE(2rP2j,k )|Ψ (2)〉 on the last registers, and sends the registers of |Ψ ′ (1)〉 and |Ψ ′ (2)〉 to P1.
(e) Let |Ψ ′′〉 := |Ψ ′ (1)〉 if n1,L′ = 1; otherwise |Ψ ′′〉 := |Ψ ′ (2)〉. Then, P1 sends the last register of |Ψ ′′〉 to Q.
Note that the entangled state is
|Ψ ′′〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
e
ı2π(rQj +rP 1j +
∑L′
k=0 rP 2j,k+
∑L′
k=0 n1,kn22k/Nj+1)x |x, x, x, x〉,
where Pi has the ith register and Q has the last two registers.
(f) To the entangled state, Q applies SE(−2(rQj +
∑j−1
k=0 ykNk/Nj+1)), P1 applies SE(−2rP1j ), P2 applies
SE(−2∑L′k=0 rP2j,k ), and the parties obtain
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
eı2π(
∑L′
k=0 n1,kn22k−
∑j−1
k=0 ykNk)x/Nj+1 |x, x, x, x〉
= 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
eı2π(n1n2−
∑j−1
k=0 ykNk)x/Nj+1 |x, x, x, x〉
= 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
eı2πyj x/N |x, x, x, x〉.
(g) Every party applies QFT to the state. Then,
1√
N5
N−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
u1=0
N−1∑
u2=0
N−1∑
u3=0
N−1∑
u4=0
eı2πyj x/Neı2πxu1/Neı2πxu2/Neı2πxu3/Neı2πxu4/N |u1, u2, u3, u4〉
= 1√
N5
N−1∑
u1=0
N−1∑
u2=0
N−1∑
u3=0
N−1∑
u4=0
(
N−1∑
x=0
eı2π(yj+
∑4
i=1 ui)x/N
)
|u1, u2, u3, u4〉
= 1√
N3
∑
yj+∑4i=1 ui≡0 (mod N)
|u1, u2, u3, u4〉.
(h) When every party measures the state, Pi obtains ui and Q obtains u3 and u4, satisfying yj +∑4i=1 ui ≡
0 (mod N).
(i) Each Pi announces ui to Q.
(j) Q obtains yj by computing −∑4i=1ui (mod N).
(2) Finally, Q obtains the multiplication t by computing∑L yjNj .j=0
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the value of t . Moreover, each Pi cannot know any other input or intermediate result because Q’s third register can
prevent a coalition of all other parties from obtaining partial information and rQj , rP1j , and rP2j,k are unknown. 
Especially, we can construct a quantum binary multiplication protocol by let N = 2.
Corollary 2. There exists a quantum binary protocol in order to solve MULTI(P2).
Proof. In Theorem 4.1, let us consider a protocol for N = 2. First, Q makes an entangled state 1√
2
(|0,0,0,0〉 +
|1,1,1,1〉). For a binary protocol, the parties use S and H instead of SE and QFT in the protocol of Theorem 4.1. 
Obviously, either P1 or P2 knows t , he or she can know the other input. However, this problem does not occur
when we consider a problem such that multiple parties compute multiplication.
MULTI: Let P1,P2, . . . ,Pm be m parties, and each party Pi have a positive integer ni > 0. Then, a party Q wishes
to obtain the multiplication t =∏mi=1 ni under the condition that any eavesdropper intercepting any quantum system
being exchanged among the parties must not be able to acquire information.
We can construct a protocol of solving MULTI by using a part of the protocol in Theorem 4.1 as a subroutine
recursively. For example, three parties, P1, P2, and P3, have integers n1, n2, and n3, respectively, and Q wishes to
obtain the multiplication of them, i.e., n1 × n2 × n3. They can compute the value by regarding the pair of (P2,P3) as
P2 in the protocol. In general, m parties, P1,P2, . . . ,Pm, have integers n1, n2, . . . , nm, respectively, and Q wishes to
obtain the multiplication of them, i.e.,
∏m
i=1 ni . They can compute the value by regarding (P2,P3, . . . ,Pm) as P2 in
the protocol.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a quantum protocol in order to solve MULTI.
Proof. For three parties, P1,P2,P3, we construct a quantum protocol satisfying MULTI. We can construct a general
protocol among m parties in the same way. Here, we omit random values and their operations used in Theorem 4.1 in
order to only express the essential part.
First, the parties share an entangled state
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
|x, x, x, x, x〉,
where Pi has the ith register and Q has the last two registers, and let n1 =∑L′k=0 n1,k2k .
For each n1,k , P1 and the pair of (P2,P3) execute step 1(d) in Theorem 4.1 by regarding (P2,P3) as P2. Here, the
state used in step 1(d)(ii) is constructed as follows: for each k, P2 and P3 consider computing n22k × n3 instead of
n2 × n3. They execute step 1(d) between themselves and obtain a state
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
eı2πn2n32
kx/Nj+1 |x, x, x, x, x〉.
By the protocol between P1 and (P2,P3) in step 1(d), a state
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
eı2πn1n2n3x/N
j+1 |x, x, x, x, x〉
is obtained. Finally, Q can know the value of n1n2n3 by executing steps 1(e)–2. 
For two positive integers n1 and n2, let n1 ÷ n2 be also an integer. Then, by noting that n1 ÷ n2 = n1 × 1/n2,
we can construct a quantum division protocol by replacing n2 to 1/n2 in the protocol of Theorem 4.1. Moreover, by
applying these protocols, we can easily compute moduli of integers such as n1 + n2 (mod N) and n1n2 (mod N). We
can also compute the values of polynomial expressions by combining these protocols.
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We showed some quantum arithmetic operation protocols among multiple parties. Our results can be used as
protocols for computing the values of arithmetic operations (e.g., addition and multiplication) without letting any party
knowing any input or intermediate result. In [19], we constructed quantum addition protocols using entangled states
under the same condition. For the present, both results may be only theoretical. However, in our addition protocols
in this paper, the parties do not share entangled states but only transfer qubit states. Therefore, from a practical point
of view, we think that the quantum protocols transferring qubit states will be able to be constructed easier than those
sharing entangled states, or may be nearly immediately practical. For quantum multiplication protocols, we also use
entangled states. Therefore, it is an interesting problem to find protocols such that parties do not share entangled states.
It is known that any unknown quantum state cannot be copied precisely, and this is the foundation of quantum
information security including our results. On the other hand, an eavesdropper can copy any values in classical pro-
tocols if a channel is insecure. Therefore, in order to realize the arithmetic operations, we need some cryptographic
technique. However, our proposed protocols do not need any cryptosystem.
In this paper, we focused on constructing the protocols of arithmetic operations without letting any party knowing
any input or intermediate result. We assumed that Q can obtain always the computing result correctly. If we do not
put the assumption, a party may execute the protocols destructively in order to obtain some information. For example,
a significant problem occurs in the case that any eavesdropper must not know some input or intermediate result even
if the protocols fail. Therefore, it is also an interesting problem to construct secure protocols against any attacks.
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